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Writer: Larry Sturchio
Info: PENN STATE GRAD 1972 (ACCOUNTING) US NAVY (1964-66) USS AULT (DD698) DESTROYER CATHEDRAL HIGH SCRANTON, PA 1963 PICTURE MY SON CHRIS DIED 1992
Directed by Michael Winterbottom; liked it 264 Votes; duration 1H 44minute; 
; movie Info Greed is a movie starring Asa Butterfield, Isla Fisher, and Sophie Cookson. Satire about the world of the super-rich; 2019.
Well, I guess the answer was greed. Eggs are unfertilized young. It's really just a lump of genetic information. Absolutely LOVED this! It made me want to learn Psychology again.
I am so happy movies are becoming normal again
Stupid audience laughing, we should cry at ourselves, poor humans. I love this song, and the visualizer is nice too. Keep the good work up. My sister's will come down with rock music. 
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Greedent. Green lantern. No surprise the RHNJ cast involved with a shady business dealer. Thats how they roll. Top Shop errr sorry top shot, which is a comment on the cinematography more than anything else. Greed is good. Anyone seeing this should think about how the animal they are eating, suffered. Amazing as usual can wait to see more from jade and josh as well as the whole willdabeast crew. Greed for glory. Greedy in spanish. Green day. Greed fall multiplayer. Philip Green biopic. I bet all the rich people were like. Omg. my dad is gonna be PISSED when I tell him they took he earned in a scam i fell for. Greedfall čeština. Greediest streamer on twitch. Greed and fear index.
Bern is an underrated lyricist. Imagery, story telling, And vocabulary. Dude is way more fire than what he gets credit for. Reforged? More like refucked. I'm a big defender of WoW, but this Reforged nonsense is too much bullshit. I refunded it when they pushed back the release date. And it looks like I did good. Greed 1924. Green bay packers. Greed in spanish. 
We use cookies to offer you a better experience, personalize content, tailor advertising, provide social media features, and better understand the use of our services. To learn more or modify/prevent the use of cookies, see our Cookie Policy and Privacy Policy. The recent financial crisis, and repeated corporate scandals, raise serious questions about whether a business school education contributes to what some have described as a culture of greed. The dominance of economic-related courses in MBA curricula led us to assess the effects of economics education on greed in three studies using multiple methods. Study 1 found that economics majors and students who had taken multiple economics courses kept more money in a money allocation task (the Dictator Game). Study 2 found that economics education was associated with more positive attitudes toward greed and toward one's own greedy behavior. Study 3 found that a short statement on the societal benefits of self-interest led to more positive ratings of greed's moral acceptability, even for noneconomics students. These effects suggest that economics education may have serious, albeit unintended consequences on our students' attitudes toward greed. Figures - uploaded by Long Wang Author content All figure content in this area was uploaded by Long Wang Content may be subject to copyright. A preview of the PDF is not available... Emotions often guide individuals' decision making (Mellers & McGraw, 2001;Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997;Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999), and emotions experienced during an ethical dilemma are also likely to affect ethical decision making. Building on the research on emotions in decision making and business ethics ( Graham et al., 2013;Haidt, 2003;Mellers et al., 1997;Mellers et al., 1999;Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011), our research focuses on two types of emotions, moral versus hedonic emotions, that guide business students' ethical decision making....... For example, some studies have found that students majoring in economics make decisions that are more selfish (Kasser et al., 2007;Kay et al., 2004;Liberman et al., 2004). Additionally, the more exposure they have to business school, the more likely that they will approach an ethical decision from the perspective of the business principles of self-interest and profit maximization by calculating the expected outcomes and the utility of different options ( Wang et al., 2011)....... This research contributes to the business ethics education, emotions, and ethical decision-making literature. First, by introducing a model of moral and hedonic emotions, we have extended the literature on business education and ethics (Birtch & Chiang, 2014;McCabe, Dukerich, & Dutton, 1994;Walker, 1992; Wang et al., 2011). While caution associated with the relationship between an economic mind-set and selfishness is not new (Krishnan, 2008;Walker, 1992;Wang et al., 2011), to date, the explanation for it has been mostly cognition-based (e. g., Wang et al., 2011) or value-based (e. g., Krishnan, 2008).... Business schools face a dilemma of promoting prosocial values while maintaining the principles of self-interest and profit maximization. In response to recent research suggesting that emotions may be the key to ethical decision making, we ask two basic questions: Do emotions make business students more ethical? Is business school education inhibiting ethical decision making? Drawing on theories on moral emotions and ethical decision making, we hypothesize that moral emotions will enhance ethical decision making, whereas hedonic emotions will diminish ethical decision making. Furthermore, we predict that a higher level of business school education will strengthen the negative relationship between hedonic emotions and ethical decision making while weakening the positive relationship between moral emotions and ethical decision making. Using a scenario-based repeated-measure design, we tested our hypotheses with 217 students from secondary schools, undergraduate business majors, and MBA programs in Hong Kong. Multilevel modeling results supported our hypotheses, suggesting that business school students may benefit from education on the unique roles of moral and hedonic emotions in the ethical decision-making process. We conclude with a summary of the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.... instead, they preferred options that reflected their ABBREVIATED TITLE 23 competitiveness and individualism (Piff et al., 2010). Similar effects have been documented with economics students ( Wang et al., 2011). When allowed to divide $10 between themselves and a counterpart, 64. 1% of economics students (vs....... For instance, economics students (vs. students of other subjects) are presumed to have a monetary mind-set by default (e. g., Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011). Likewise, money is salient for sports players who are in their final contract year (Beus & Whitman, 2017), and people who have just withdrawn money from a cash machine would naturally think about money (Guéguen & Jacob, 2013)....... When given the opportunity to divide $10 between themselves and a randomly assigned counterpart in any way that they wished, economics students were also more likely than other students to sacrifice the interests of other players to benefit themselves, t(107) = 3. 66, p <. 001, d = 0. 33 ( Wang et al., 2011). In addition, individuals who value money and fame were found to secure their own benefit by eliminating forests sooner in a resource dilemma compared to those who valued intimacy and community, t(35) = 2. 18, p <. 05... Many empirical studies have demonstrated the psychological effects of various aspects of money, including the aspiration for money, mere thoughts about money, possession of money, and placement of people in economic contexts. Although multiple aspects of money and varied methodologies have been focused on and implemented, the underlying mechanisms of the empirical findings from these seemingly isolated areas significantly overlap. In this paper, we operationalize money as a broad concept and take a novel approach by providing an integrated review of the literature and identifying five major streams of mechanisms: (a) self-focused behavior; (b) inhibited other-oriented behavior; (c) favoring of a self–other distinction; (d) money’s relationship with self-esteem and self-efficacy; and (e) goal pursuit, objectification, outcome maximization, and unethicality. Moreover, we propose a unified psychological perspective for the future—money as an embodiment of social distinction—which could potentially account for past findings and generate future work.... The discussion on greed is as old as the discussion on wealth and power. Although a consensus has been reached that greed is a common and inevitable part of human nature (Balot, 2001; Wang et al., 2011), people seem to hold different attitudes toward greed. The famous quote by the lead character in the movie Wall Street says, "greed......... In fact, greed is highly valued in some organizations and societies (Bruhn and Lowrey, 2012). In contrast, almost all religions treat greed as immoral and evil ( Wang et al., 2011). Similarly, studies have suggested that greed is associated with many negative characteristics ( Gilliland and Anderson, 2011)....... Although we use the concept of greed often in everyday life, there is a lack of a consistent definition of greed ( Wang et al., 2011). Some definitions emphasize the "cost to others, " which indicates that greed is socially harmful (Balot, 2001;Mussel et al., 2015).... Greed is one of the most common features of human nature, and it has recently attracted increasing research interest. The aims of this paper are to provide one of the first empirical investigations of the effects of greed on job performance and to explore the mediating role of the need for social status and perceived distributive justice. Using a working sample (N=315) from China, the current study found that greed promoted both task and contextual performance through the intermediary effect of the need for social status. At the same time, greed inhibited both types of performance through perceived distributive justice. These results confirmed our hypothesis that greed is a double-edged sword with opposite effects on one’s performance. The findings suggest that organizations should both address greedy employees’ social status concerns and ensure that they are treated fairly so that organizations can fully utilize the talents of greedy people and channel their energy in a beneficial direction.... There is a wealth of studies examining the relation between economic education and unethical or less ethical behaviours (Kirchgässner, 2005). Some studies report evidence that exposure to courses in economics is related to increased free-riding behaviour (Marwell and Ames, 1981), less cooperation ( Frey et al., 1993), selfish behaviour (Carter and Irons, 1991), corruption behaviour (Frank and Schulze, 2000), less charitable behaviour (Bauman and Rose, 2011) or increased levels of greed ( Wang et al., 2011). Racko (2019, p. 44) found that studying economics is "associated with an increase in the importance of hedonism and power values and a decrease in the importance of self-direction value".... Purpose This study aims to address the topic of ethics, responsibility and sustainability (ERS) orientation of students enrolled in schools of economics and management master’s degrees. It examines the effect of educational background and gender on Portuguese students’ orientation towards ERS, as well as the extent to which there is a relation between the scientific area of the master degree in which the student is enrolled and his/her ERS orientation. Design/methodology/approach The authors used a sample of 201 students from several master degrees offered by the School of Economics and Management of a large public Portuguese university and analysed their ERS orientation using a survey by questionnaire. Findings Findings suggest that there are differences in orientation across gender, with female students valuing ERS more than their male counterparts. Educational background has minimal effects on the responses. It was also found some sort of selection effect in terms of the scientific area of the master degree and ERS orientation. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature by analysing the issue of whether students with an educational background in economics and management present different ERS orientation than their counterparts, as well as by examining whether there is some sort of self-selection into the study of disciplines in which ERS orientation is likely to be a week. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first study analysing this type of issue regarding ERS.... For example, prior studies provide evidence that exposure to ideologies reifying selfinterest and shareholder profit maximization (e. g., through business education or at work) leads people to behave more selfishly (Giacalone & Promislo, 2013;Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011). When exposed to such expectations, even those who do not personally agree with them believe that they are expected to comply with them in the workplace (Beggs & Lane, 1989).... This chapter distinguishes four facets of CSR and explains how they influence employees’ experience of meaningful work. Specifically, it is described how stakeholders’ CSR expectations help employees understand which aspects of their work are of value to others; how CSR assessments provide feedback to employees about whether they are meeting stakeholders’ expectations; how CSR attributions affect employees’ experience of kinship at work; and how organizations’ CSR responses provide opportunities for employees to experience personal agency in addressing socio-environmental concerns. Boundary conditions on these effects are discussed, including (1) employees’ agreement with stakeholder expectations, (2) their sense of control over socio-environmental outcomes; and the degree to which employees (3) identify with groups to which stakeholders attribute social (ir)responsibility and (4) perceive personal growth opportunities through CSR involvement. These insights contribute to understanding CSR as a context that influences employees’ experience of work.... Intuitively, the former makes much more sense; experience should lead individuals to make better decisions, and it is hard to see value in learning patterns that make an actor less rational. Indeed, traditional economic theories predict that increased experience with markets should lead to a reduction in both irrational biases and irrational overall decision making, with more rational decision making observed in cases where subjects have extensive experience (e. g., through their jobs; List, 2003List,, 2004) or training (e. g., taking economics classes; Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011). Interestingly, though, for the biases we will address in this paper, there is no evidence of a reduction across childhood (see also, Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2001).... Humans make countless choices every day that affect their health, safety, and finances. Despite the high stakes, decision-making is often irrational from the viewpoint of traditional economics, i. e., the choices made are contrary to existing preferences. This leads to negative consequences for individuals and to inefficiencies in the exchange of goods. The fields of behavioral and experimental economics have made great strides in understanding these sub-optimal patterns of behavior, but we still cannot always predict human decisions. In this paper, we present developmental, cross-cultural, and comparative findings for three irrational tendencies (framing effects, the endowment effect, and inequity aversion) to illustrate two different patterns that experience can play in their formation. This analysis allows us to consider why these tendencies have emerged, what benefits they may bring to the decision-maker, and to propose types of interventions that may combat these tendencies. Throughout, we suggest where this approach of combining comparative and developmental work can address theoretical debates and practical questions within the field of behavioral economics. Previous research on the Portuguese case confirmed free-riding, free-marketer and right-wing political inclinations among economics students. Further scrutiny was endeavored here, perceiving also a considerably increased interest for politics, notwithstanding the lack of concern for public problems. Various aspects of free-riding proclivity were distinguished and discussed, relating them with youngsters’ risk-loving and sensation-seeking tendencies, but also with a number of other facets specific to economics students, including: prevalence of achievement values, contextual influences on morals, peer pressure, perceived group status and social expectations regarding the economic profession. At a time when some people are questioning the relevancy of business education in general, others are now asking whether MBA programs should be blamed for society's declining trust in business and the numerous corporate ethical failures of recent decades. Whether the full blame lies with business schools or not, MBA instructors are actively seeking more effective ways to help students adopt more practical and ethical managerial paradigms. Because trust theory is simple and robust and outlines the basic mental processes that drive economic exchange while simultaneously prioritizing ethical behavior, in this article, we argue that it is distinctively suited to operationalize stakeholder theory in the classroom, providing MBA students with both a principled and a practical foundation or thematic platform for their MBA coursework and subsequent careers. We also discuss potential challenges and limitations and provide recommendations for future research. Prior research has shown a pronounced self-orientation in students of business and economics. This article examines if self-orientation can be alleviated by a focus on prosocial values in business education. In a cross-sectional design, we test the prosocial behavior and values of bachelor students at the beginning and the end of a traditional 3-year business administration program. We compare their behavior with the behavior of two different groups: students from an ethically-oriented international management school and students from a social work program of equal length. The results showed that students of business administration show less prosocial behavior in a dictator game than students in the other two groups. This difference is larger between final-year students than between first-year students. According to the results of the Schwartz Value Survey, the Inglehart Index, and a scale for preferences for distributive justice, students in the three disciplines differ substantially in prosocial values, but there is no significant difference between first and last semester students of the same discipline. We conclude that there is no transmission of self-oriented behavior through self-oriented values emended in traditional business education curricula. Instead, students seem to select academic programs according to their personal and preexisting social orientations. In recent years consumption has begun to be examined as a social process that satisfies the psychological needs such as creating and presenting the self, identifying the status or social class, building relationships with others, influencing people in the environment or admiring oneself and proving themselves. In this context greed, materialism, and arrogance are considered as a dark personality trait of consumers’ which in turn effect their life satisfaction. While materialism and greed decrease life satisfaction, consumer arrogance has mixed effects on life satisfaction with a positive or a negative direction. This study aims to examine the direct effects of greed on materialism, consumer arrogance, and life satisfaction as well as the mediating role of consumer arrogance on the relationship between materialism and life satisfaction. The data were collected from 500 households who live in Antakya/Turkey by using area sampling method and face to face interview technique. The hypotheses of the study were tested with path analysis using structural equation modeling. The results indicate that greed influence directly and positively to materialism and consumer arrogance. In addition, the mediating analysis shows that consumer arrogance has an inconsistent mediated effect on the relationship between materialism and life satisfaction. Within this inconsistent mediation model, while the direct effect of materialism on life satisfaction is negative the mediated effect of consumer arrogance turns these directions into positive. Therefore, consumer arrogance not only increased life satisfaction but also caused materialism effect to be positive. Also, it was found that age has a positive effect on materialism, whereas a negative effect on greed. These findings have been discussed and suggestions are provided for future research. This article comments on a paper by Sumantra Ghoshal published in this issue of Academy of Management Learning & Education which argues that academic research related to the conduct of business and management has had some very significant and negative influences on the practice of management. The author notes that in a word, Ghoshal is right. He is right in the sense that economics is indeed taking over management and organization science, just as it has taken over political science and law and is making inroads into sociology and psychology--trends that have been occasionally documented and could, and should be, empirically studied. The field of economics has more and more tended to dominate the formulation of curricula and research agendas in all of the social and policy sciences and, in some cases, even in the humanities. Ghoshal is right that this takeover matters, because social theories matter. The theories that come to be believed and accepted affect both public and organizational policies and practices. Moreover, as Ghoshal notes, theories, once accepted, set into motion processes that tend to ensure they become self-fulfilling. And Ghoshal is certainly right when he reiterates that the assumptions of much of economic theory and the effects of these assumptions on people and institutions can be harmful. M. B. A. programs in the United States continue to admit foreign students in record numbers, yet we know little about how this cultural diversity may impact the values and ethical decision making behavior of either American or foreign students. The research discussed here examined this issue within the context of a large M. program where non-U S. citizens comprise over twenty percent of the student mparisons of U. S. and Asian students supported existing notions about the independent vs. interdependent conceptions of the role of the individual within each culture. However, these differences were not a major factor in explaining the significantly different choices made by U. and Asian students in selected decision making vignettes. Please do not cite or distribute without the author(s) permission. Rational choice models suggest that decisions should be both deliberate and calculative. In contrast, the current research suggests that calculations may lead to unintended social and moral consequences. We tested whether engaging in a calculative task would lead decision makers to overlook the social and moral consequences of their subsequent decisions and act selfishly and unethically. In each of the first four experiments, participants first completed either a calculative or a comparable, non-calculative task followed by an ostensibly unrelated decision task (either a Dictator or a modified Ultimatum Game). Compared to the non-calculative tasks, completing the calculative tasks led people to be consistently more selfish in the Dictator Game and more unethical in the modified Ultimatum Game. A final experiment tested whether the calculative task led to more self-interested behavior through increased utilitarian judgments and dampened emotional reactions; it also examined whether a subtle, social intervention might mitigate these effects. Discover the world's research Join ResearchGate to find the people and research you need to help your work.
Greedy ariana grande lyrics. Greedy movie. Greedge. Greed island aiai. Ja rule my partner in crime, Billy McFarland. Greed 2. Sold by Services LLC Download this game instantly! How it works How downloads work Download this game immediately from a link in Your Games Library on Amazon or from your confirmation email. The game wilI be stored in Your Games Library, so you can always download it again later. Platform: Windows Vista, Windows XP Image Unavailable Image not available for Color: Sorry, this item is not available in Image not available To view this video download Flash Player About the product Three Unique Classes To Choose From. Huge Variety Of Different Levels With Three Settings. Hundreds Of Items To Collect. Upgradeable Character Attributes. Product information ASIN B003AYEHY8 Release date March 22, 2010 Customer Reviews 2. 5 out of 5 stars Pricing The strikethrough price is the List Price. Savings represents a discount off the List Price. Countries Note: Currently, this item is available only to customers located in the United States. Return Policy This product is non-returnable and non-refundable. Terms of Use By placing your order, you agree to our Terms of Use. Product description Product Description In the futuristic universe of GREED, the discovery of new interstellar travel possibilities has led to a new age of colonialization. The five largest colonial powers are entangled in a full-scale war over a new element called Ikarium, the recently discovered rare source of nearly unlimited energy. As a former member of an elite military unit, you will fight a battle for your survival not knowing that your actions will lead the fate of all mankind into dramatic consequences... From the Manufacturer Hack 'n slash your way through this science-fiction-themed action / RPG. In the futuristic universe of GREED, the discovery of new interstellar travel possibilities has led to a new age of colonialization. As a former member of an elite military unit, you will fight a battle for your survival not knowing that your actions will lead the fate of all mankind into dramatic consequence... Three entirely different character classes to choose from A huge variety of different levels in three unique settings, each playable on 3 difficulties, inhabited by fierce and deadly creatures & screen-filling end bosses Upgradeable skills in three categories per character class – the simultaneous use of these categories causes thrilling skill combinations Hundreds of items to collect that upgrade weapons and armour Online and local cooperative multiplayer mode for up to three players System Requirements Minimum Specifications: OS: Windows XP / Windows Vista / Windows 7 Processor: Pentium 4 3. 4 GHz or Athlon 64 3600+ RAM: 1 GB (2 GB for Multiplayer) Hard Drive: 2 GB Video Card: Graphics adapter supporting PixelShader 2. 0 and 128 MB RAM, at least GeForce 7600 or Radeon X series Additional Info: LAN or internet connection (for online gaming) 2 customer reviews There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later.
Greedfall trailer.
Greed meaning. Greedy definition. Greed film steve coogan. Greedfall mods. We use cookies to offer you a better experience, personalize content, tailor advertising, provide social media features, and better understand the use of our services. To learn more or modify/prevent the use of cookies, see our Cookie Policy and Privacy Policy. The sustainable use of common pool resources has become a significant global challenge. It is now widely accepted that specific mechanisms such as community-based management strategies, institutional responses such as resource privatization, information availability and emergent social norms can be used to constrain individual ‘harvesting’ to socially optimal levels. However, there is a paucity of research focused specifically on aligning profitability and sustainability goals. In this paper, an integrated mathematical model of a common pool resource game is developed to explore the nexus between the underlying costs and benefits of harvesting decisions and the sustainable level of a shared, dynamic resource. We derive optimal harvesting efforts analytically and then use numerical simulations to show that individuals in a group can learn to make harvesting decisions that lead to the globally optimal levels. Individual agents make their decision based on signals received and a trade-off between economic and ecological sustainability. When the balance is weighted towards profitability, acceptable economic and social outcomes emerge. However, if individual agents are solely driven by profit, the shared resource is depleted in the long run - sustainability is possible despite some greed, but too much will lead to over-exploitation. 1 Scientific RepoRts | 7: 2307 | DOI:10. 1038/s41598-017-02151-y Sustainability is possible despite greed - Exploring the nexus between protability and sustainability in common pool resource systems Friedrich Burkhard von der Osten, Michael Kirley & Tim Miller The sustainable use of common pool resources has become a signicant global challenge. It is now widely accepted that specic mechanisms such as community-based management strategies, institutional responses such as resource privatization, information availability and emergent social norms can be used to constrain individual ‘harvesting’ to socially optimal levels. However, there is a paucity of research focused specically on aligning protability and sustainability goals. In this paper, an integrated mathematical model of a common pool resource game is developed to explore the nexus between the underlying costs and benets of harvesting decisions and the sustainable level of a shared, dynamic resource. We derive optimal harvesting eorts analytically and then use numerical simulations to show that individuals in a group can learn to make harvesting decisions that lead to the globally optimal levels. Individual agents make their decision based on signals received and a trade-o between economic and ecological sustainability. When the balance is weighted towards protability, acceptable economic and social outcomes emerge. However, if individual agents are solely driven by prot, the shared resource is depleted in the long run - sustainability is possible despite some greed, but too much will lead to over -exploitation. e sustainable use of enviro nmental, social and technical resources has become a signicant global challenge 1, 2. Resource misuse, such as over -shing 3 – 5 or deforestation 6 – 8 can potentially r esult in supply problems and lead to both economic and ecological damage. W hen the harvesting (or use of) a shared social-economic resource diminishes the value of the resource for o ther users (negative externality), and it is dicult to contro l access to the resource in the absence of well-dened pro perty rights (non-excludability), the resource is typically referred to as a common pool resource (CPR) 9 – 12. CPR systems are characterized by a social dilemma – the tra gedy of the commons 13 – 15. a t is, the goal of an independently-acting individual is to maximize their use of the reso urce (gain higher portions of the harvest). However, if all individuals restrained their use of the resource, contrary to their selsh motiva tions, it should be possible to maintain the resource a t a sustainable level, beneting the population as a whole. An individu - al’ s selsh motivations to reap b igger prots manifest in the implicit as sumption that investing mor e eort into harvesting will gain a larger proportion of the harvest and th us a higher prot, however, this proportional gains assumption is never expres sed explicitly 16, 17. ere is a large body of litera ture describing the management and go vernance of CPR systems. Perhaps most famous is the pioneering work o f Elinor Ostrom 9, 15, 18, who identied the benets of managing the com - mons de-centrally and documented design principles f or stable resource management. is w ork led to sub - stantial related research in the eld 19 – 22, in labo ratory settings 23 – 26, as well as via simulation experiments 17, 27 – 30. Consequently, a number of external factors have been signalled as acting as drivers for cooperation in the com - mons, including: comm unication between individuals 21, 31 – 33; punishment of defector s 26, 34 – 37; reward 38 – 40; trust 14, 41, 42; social norms 22, 35, 43; and explicit con sideration of the future 25, 44, 45. The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to F. B. v. d. O. (email:) R eceived: 19 July 2016 A ccepted: 6 April 2017 P ublished: xx xx xxxx OPEN 2 Scientific RepoRts | 7: 2307 | DOI:10. 1038/s41598-017-02151-y e inherent uncertainties and dynamics of social-ecological systems 26, 46, 47 exacerbate the social dilemma, as decision-making encapsulates a com plex balance of external inuences and internal beliefs 17, 19. Axelrod and others 48 – 52 note that cooperation in social dilemmas oen comes about because restraint serves both collective and individual interests. Wh en the long-term viability or wealth generation capab ilities of individuals (economic entities) is also considered, the issue of ecological sustainab ility in the commons is more complex 53 – 57. us, an important question is “H ow do individuals re alize that restr aint is good for their person al interest and t he collective interest”? In this paper, w e depart from the mainstream literature o n CPR systems by exploring the nexus between protability and s ustainability when individuals make a harvesting decision in a dynamic common pool resour ce game. Most models focus on ho w to prevent selfish individuals from depleting a shared r esource, thereby abstracting from the fact that any res traint from resource exploitatio n may also provide sucient pro t for the population. T ypically, the strive fo r protability is seen as the underlying problem ra ther than being seen as a key component of a ro bust solution to this complex social-ecological dilemma. W e remove the implicit pr oportional gains assumption and r eplace it with the explicit consideration of pr ot as a measure for decision-making. W e introduce an integrated mathema tical model of a CPR game based on the work of Sethi and Somanathan 30. Here, individual harvesting decisions ar e guided by an egoistic component (wealth genera tion) and an altruistic component (sustainab ility of the shared resource) dictated by social norms. Akin to the notion of a ‘ triple bottom line’ 58, the goal is to in tegrate both economical and environmen tal aspects to reach sustainability. Our CPR ga me is a stochastic model where there are uncertainties as sociated with the return on harvesting eorts and long-term growth rate of the resour ce. Individuals can only observe the state of the shared resour ce and the overall invest - ment of all individuals in the population. W e use analytical techniques to derive maxim um yields in terms of both sustainability and economics f or given game settings. W e show that it is possible to derive an a nalytical solution for optimal harvesting on a system-wide scale, but indi vidual behaviour is dicult to predict, as it depends on the interaction of individuals with each other and the r esource. Given these diculties, we use numerical simulation experiments to in vestigate individuals’ harvesting deci- sions over the long-term. In each r ound of the game, individuals receive weighted rewar d signals containing both economical and ecological components. Emergen t behaviours are subsequently analysed. W e show that individuals can learn harvesting actions that maintain the sha red resource at a sustainable level. Im portantly, we show that the population as a whole can learn the a pproximate optimal global behaviour, even when individuals mostly weight their personal pro tability over long-run resource sustainab ility. Individ uals learn that long-term sustainability is good for their long-term p rot too. W e also explore the eects of varying harvesting cost/benet ratios, nding for instance tha t when prot margins are too high agents becom e too greedy and over-exploit the shared resource, thereb y providing suggestions on when exog enous intervention might be important to ind uce an approp riate balance between prot and sustainability mo tives. Model and Analysis In this section, we introduce our integra ted model of the CPR game based on coupled dierential equations tha t capture resource d ynamics and individual agent behaviours. e model is pr esented in stages. First, pure resource dynamics are introduced – the int erplay between the growth rate and harvest level of a resource ar e dened. In the second stage, the sustainability pr operties of the resource dynamics are determined. In the third stage, the relationship between the ‘inves tment eort’ agents make to harvesting an d the cost and prot are described. In the nal stage, all components are in tegrated into one model and eects of cost and ha rvesting eorts are explained. An analysis of protab le and sustainable harvesting eorts highlights limitations of this a pproach and the require - ments of the model, which are then transla ted into goals for individual agents. The common pool resource game. In the CPR literature, ther e are two types of model in which agents simultaneously harvest a resource. e rst model focusses on situations where the users of the resource diminis h the relative value per resource unit in the current time period as their harvest level increases, however, the futur e value of the resource is undiminished 59. In co ntrast, in the dynamic CPR model the current users of the resource reduce the level of the resource and thereb y harm future users of the resource 60, 61. Un certainty of resource lev - els tends to promot e over-harvesting 62, while resource scarcity induces gr eed 63. us, by explicitly considering resource dynamics on the one hand a nd macro-economic and social dynamics on the other, a more complete picture can be established. In our CPR game, a group o f n agents harvest a resource that is expressed as a resour ce level N. e resource has a certain capacity N max and the resource level may ch ange from time t − 1 to t: =+ − −− − NN GN HX N () (, ) (1) tt tt t 11 1 where N t is the resource level a t time t, G is the growth level of the resource and H is the harvest taken awa y from the resource. e temporal paramet er t can represent time, for examp le days, but we use it purely as an abstraction of time in terms of rounds the game is played for. Es sentially, the resource chan ges by its net growth ∆= − NG NH XN () (, ) every round. e natural growth G that increases the resour ce stock can take various forms, for example logistic gr owth (growth level G as a function of N): = − GN rN N N () 1 g where r g is the intrinsic replenishmen t rate and N max is the maximum carrying capacity of the resource. Figure 1 shows the growth G as a function of the resource leve l N in green. 3 Scientific RepoRts | 7: 2307 | DOI:10. 1038/s41598-017-02151-y e harvest function H, is modelled using the Cobb - Douglas production function 64: β = αα − HX NX N (, ) (3) 1 with constants, where α indicates the inuence the resource level a nd invested eort have on the harvesting outcome. e harvest function depends on the cumulat ed eort X invested in the harvest and the state of the resource N. e Cobb-Douglas production function is a popular t ool in economics to relate capital, labour and the possible outcomes when using the two in puts to produce goods. When modelled onto the CPRG, ca pital is expressed by the resource N and labour i s expressed by the invested eort X; together they produce the harvest H. e function can never produce a negative o utcome. In this interpretation the ha rvest function is a ‘black box’ to agents, that is, an agen t cannot predict its exact harvest. A lower α value means that the harvest depends mor e on the resource than on the eort in vested, and vice versa for a higher α. e cumulated eort X refers to the to tal eort invested in harvesting the resource. It is a cumula tion of the eort x i of n individual agents i participatin g in the game: ∑ = Xx i In the CPR game, X and x i are limited by up per and lower bounds respectively. Figure 1 shows the minimum and maximum harvest H as a function of eort X and reso urce level N in blue and red respectively, depending on the upper and lower bounds of X. Each agent i can choose an eort x i to invest. I nvesting eort is associated with a cost c and each agent gets rewarded a pay-o π i propo rtional to its investment compared to the co mbined invested eort X of the group: π =− HX Nc x (, ) i i i where c is the constant cost per unit o f eort invested and H ( X, N) is the harvest (the total payo in the game is). Each agents keeps track of its assets A i and adds/sub tracts its pay-o π i each round it plays the game: Figure 1. B asic resource dynamics: G describes the growth added to the resource depending o n the current resource level N; H describes the harvest taken from the resource, depending o n resource level N and cumulative eort X. Here the limi tations of the harvest are shown with the minimum and maxim um cumulative eort respectively ( α = 0. 4, β = 0. 35, r g = 0. 5, N max = 1, 000, see T able 1). Parameter Val u e N max 1000 r g 0. 5 α 0. 35 β 0. 4 X min 100 X max 500 c 0. 5 T able 1. CPRG parameters used in the experiments. 4 Scientific RepoRts | 7: 2307 | DOI:10. 1038/s41598-017-02151-y ii i where A and π are an abstraction of real mo netary value. An agent can only observe the state of the reso urce N t, its invested eort x i, the cumulated in vested eort X, as well as its pay-o π i and cumula ted pay-o Π, but not the actions of other individual agen ts nor their pay-os. An agent can choose how much e ort x i to invest once per round. W e later describe in detail how individuals can balance the trade-o between protability and su stainability goals by explicitly weighting objectives (denot ed by λ when considering sustainability, and ξ when considering personal assets) when making a harvesting decision. T able 1 details the CPRG parameters used in the simulations. Analysis. An agent participating in the CPR game m ust balance two possibly conicting goals across multiple rounds of the game: (a) help to ma intain the resource at a sustainable level, which i s an inherent global goal; and (b) maximize its own prot (accum ulate assets). Sustainability. A common objective of CPR systems is to ma intain a ‘steady level’ o f the resource, thereby allow - ing ‘large ’ yields over an indenite period under constant enviro nmental conditions. In our model, the global sustainability goal, λ, entails harvesting the resour ce over time in a manner such that the resource gro wth level G is at least equal to the harvest H or higher, so that the resource stock level N does not decline and the resource net growth G − H is non-nega tive. e population as a whole can regulate the ha rvest via the eort X invested. e boundary as to what level of eort yields a sustainable ha rvest is given by the Maximum Sustainable Y ield (MSY): β = − − αα ∈ ∈ − rN N N XN ma x1 XX X XX X g [, ] [, ] 1 mi nm ax mi nm ax For the resource net growth G − H to be positive, we can derive the condition β ≤ − α α − () X rN N 1 ma x sust ainabl e g N N 1 ma x which is an upper bound on the cumulative e ort invested to prevent resour ce stock levels from declining. Figure 2a shows the resource net-gr owth with Fig. 2b detailing the sustainable eort levels bounded by the MSY and the minimum and maximum eo rt that an agent can invest. Figure 2c illustrates the MSY integrated int o the resource dynamics; the green shaded area indica tes sustainable harvests based on the eort levels in Fig. 2b. An individual agent i can inuence the cum ulative eort X via contribution of x i bu t there is no clear denition of a boundary on x i for the MSY, since the cumulative eort X depends on the o ther agents in the population and we assume that agents act independently. In addition, the impact of in dividual actions diuses with higher numbers of individuals participating in the game. is action diusion a nd the lack of a dened boundary for x i make the goal of sustainability har der to control for an individual ag ent. It is clear however, that a lower inv estment of eort results in less harvest being extracted and thus higher net growth of the resource. Protability. A dominant economic stan dpoint is to simply view the shared resources as a type of a sset, which should be managed so as to maximize its value to society. In formal terms, an agen t i wishing to maximize its prot π i to full its personal goal ξ has to maximize the dierence between investment (eort) and ret urn Figure 2. Suiatainable harvest levels. ( a) Contour plot of resource net gro wth G − H; the black line indicates, eorts above this line produce nega tive net growth. ( b) Resource net growth with eort limits (thin black lines); the green shaded area emphasises sustaina ble eort levels at which the net growth G − H ≥ 0. ( c) Resource dynamics with positive net growth res ulting from the sustainable harvest eorts described in Fig. 2b indicated by the green shaded area. 5 Scientific RepoRts | 7: 2307 | DOI:10. 1038/s41598-017-02151-y (harvest); see Equation ( 5). e eort leading to the highest pro tability for the entire CPR game system can be described by the Maximum Economic Y ield (MEY): β =− αα ∈ ∈ − XN cX ma x XX X XX X [, ] [, ] 1 mi nm ax Note that we ar e optimizing for total prot, not p rot per unit of eort (which would require divisio n by X). For the prot t o be positive, i. e. H − cX ≥ 0, we can derive the condition β ≤ α α − − X N c ma x pr of it ab le 1 1 An individual agent however, will want to maximize its individual pr ot instead of the cumulative pro t of the population: β − αα ∈ − XN cx ma x x i i where is the set of actions available to an agen t. Figure 3a shows the pro t yield levels across resource and eort levels with Fig. 3b identifying positive pro ts that are bounded by the MEY and minimum and maxim um eort. Figure 3c again sho ws the MEY integrated into the resour ce dynamics, where the blue shaded area indicates p rof - itable harvests based on the eort levels in Fig. 3b. Goals. What is the optimal eo rt an agent can invest in order to full both its individual goal, ξ, a nd the collec- tive goal, λ? e sustain able and protable eort levels bounded b y MSY and MEY respectively are shown in Fig. 4a and intersect in the red shaded ar ea. Figure 4b shows sustainable a nd protable harvest levels with respect to the level of the resource, as determined by the eo rt levels in Fig. 4a. Note that the red shaded area only m akes for 7% of the possible choices for in vesting eort. e parameters of the game have been chosen such tha t only this relatively small pool of actions is viable, o therwise it would be too easy for agents to harvest sustainably and protably, as many actions lead to that ou tcome. Alternative setups for the CPRG ca n be found in ref. 65 where almost any action is sustainable an d protable. Figure 4b also shows and the minimum and maximum equilibria at which the harvest is equal to the growth. Equivalen tly, E protable is the minimum equilib - rium at which harvest becomes protable, i. is at least equal to the invested eort. Let X e denote the optimal X tha t produces sustainable and pro table harvests in the red shaded area. e opti - mal equilibrium E optimal describes the resource level at which most actions X e produce viab le harvests, it is thus the ‘safest ’ equilibrium due to robustness against in dividual agents taking unsustainable or unpr otable actions. Ideally, each agent takes an action around e such that the harvest from cumulative eo rt lies close to E optimal. is action is then denoted by x e. An agent i now has to nd a n action x i that contributes to X in such a way tha t X satises the condition in Equations ( 8) and ( 10) and is as close to X e as possib le. is presents the tragedy o f commons 13: each individual agent would fare better if all agen ts restrained their use but the interest of an indi vidual agent is to maximize use in order to gain higher portions of the harvest given the behavio ur of other agents does not change, i. maximize without changing H as seen in Equatio n ( 11). Ideally, = e but x e cannot be derived analytically, since actions of other agents cannot be accoun ted for. Note that there is a minim um investment in our game model (see T able 1). e stochastic CPRG is different from the Public Goods Game or other social dilemmas such as the P risoner’ s Dilemma, in that Figure 3. Protable harvest (when cost c = 0. 5). ( a) Contour plot of cumulati ve prot H ( X, N) − cX; the black line indicates, eorts above this line produce nega tive prot. ( b) Prot with eo rt limits (thin black lines); the blue shaded area emphasises pr otable eort levels at which the total pro t H ( X, N) − cX ≥ 0. ( c) Resource dynamics with positive pro ts resulting from the protable harvest eo rts described in Fig. 3b indicated by the blue shaded area.... The incremental benefits can be shared by the owner and contractor, and the allocation mechanism is designed by the owner [56]. Assuming that the contractor can balance the economic and environmental objectives, and assuming the constant returns to scale, the outcome function of sustainable construction follows the Cobb-Douglas production function [57, 58]... Based on the consideration of the relative importance of sustainability-related objectives and the inherent nature of sustainable construction projects, this study proposes that the contractor can balance the levels of efforts and resources used to improve the overall project sustainability. A multi-objective trade-off model using game theory was established and verified through simulation and numerical example under a moral hazard situation. Results indicate that effort levels of the contractor on sustainability-related objectives are positively related to the outcome coefficient while negatively to the coefficients of effort cost of the relevant objectives. High levels of the relative importance of sustainability-related objectives contribute to high levels of effort of the contractor. With the variation in effort levels and the coefficient of benefit allocation, the project net benefit increases before declining. The function of project benefit has a marked peak value, with an inverted “U” shape. An equilibrium always exists as for the given relative importance and coefficients of the effort costs of sustainability-related objectives. Under this condition, the owner may offer the contractor a less intense incentive and motivate the contractor reasonably arranging input resources. The coefficient of benefit allocation is affected by the contractor characteristic factors and the project characteristic factors. The owner should balance these two types of factors and select the most appropriate incentive mechanism to improve the project benefit. Meanwhile, the contractor can balance the relative importance of the objectives and arrange the appropriate levels of effort and resources to achieve a sustainability-related objective. Very few studies have emphasized the effects of the relative importance of sustainability-related objectives on the benefits of sustainable construction projects. This study therefore builds a multi-objective trade-off model to bridge this research gap. This study sheds significant theoretical and practical insights regarding the objective management of sustainability-related objectives, as well as insights into the improvement of performance in sustainable construction projects. Preserving global public goods, such as the planet's ecosystem, depends on large-scale cooperation, which is difficult to achieve because the standard reciprocity mechanisms weaken in large groups. Here we demonstrate a method by which reciprocity can maintain cooperation in a large-scale public goods game (PGG). In a first experiment, participants in groups of on average 39 people play one round of a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with their two nearest neighbours on a cyclic network after each PGG round. We observe that people engage in " local-to-global " reciprocity, leveraging local interactions to enforce global cooperation: Participants reduce PD cooperation with neighbours who contribute little in the PGG. In response, low PGG contributors increase their contributions if both neighbours defect in the PD. In a control condition, participants do not know their neighbours' PGG contribution and thus cannot link play in the PD to the PGG. In the control we observe a sharp decline of cooperation in the PGG, while in the treatment condition global cooperation is maintained. In a second experiment, we demonstrate the scalability of this effect: in a 1, 000-person PGG, participants in the treatment condition successfully sustain public contributions. Our findings suggest that this simple " local-to-global " intervention facilitates large-scale cooperation. In collective risk dilemmas, cooperation prevents collective loss only when players contribute sufficiently. In these more complex variants of a social dilemma, the form of the risk curve is crucial and can strongly affect the feasibility of a cooperative outcome. The risk typically depends on the sum of all individual contributions. Here, we introduce a general approach to analyze the stabilization of cooperation under any decreasing risk curve and discuss how different risk curves affect cooperative outcomes. We show that the corresponding solutions can be reached by social learning or evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, we extend our analysis to cases where individuals do not only care about their expected payoff, but also about the associated distribution of payoffs. This approach is an essential step to understand the effects of risk decay on cooperation. Species around the world have suffered collapses, and a key question is why some populations are more vulnerable than others. Traditional conservation biology and evidence from terrestrial species suggest that slow-growing populations are most at risk, but interactions between climate variability and harvest dynamics may alter or even reverse this pattern. Here, we test this hypothesis globally. We use boosted regression trees to analyse the influences of harvesting, species traits and climate variability on the risk of collapse (decline below a fixed threshold) across 154 marine fish populations around the world. The most important factor explaining collapses was the magnitude of overfishing, while the duration of overfishing best explained long-term depletion. However, fast growth was the next most important risk factor. Fast-growing populations and those in variable environments were especially sensitive to overfishing, and the risk of collapse was more than tripled for fast-growing when compared with slow-growing species that experienced overfishing. We found little evidence that, in the absence of overfishing, climate variability or fast growth rates alone drove population collapse over the last six decades. Expanding efforts to rapidly adjust harvest pressure to account for climate-driven lows in productivity could help to avoid future collapses, particularly among fast-growing species. © 2015 The Author(s). Mention d'édition: Routledge Studies in Ecological Economics Twenty years after the declarations from the Earth Summit in Rio, the world faces an unattenuated host of problems that threaten the goal of sustainable development. The challenge to cooperatively solve socio-ecological problems has been portrayed in Garrett Hardin's essay "The Tragedy of the Commons". While this paper remains controversial, it has inspired a vast number of theoretical, experimental, and empirical contributions that have clarified the mechanisms of collective action problems and suggested ways to overcome these. This article reviews the recent game-theoretic research in this field. Failures of cooperation cause many of society's gravest problems. It is well known that cooperation among many players faced with a social dilemma can be maintained thanks to the possibility of punishment, but achieving the initial state of widespread cooperation is often much more difficult. We show here that there exist strategies of `targeted punishment' whereby a small number of punishers can shift a population of defectors into a state of global cooperation. The heterogeneity of players, often regarded as an obstacle, can in fact boost the mechanism's effectivity. We conclude by outlining how the international community could use a strategy of this kind to combat climate change. Tower, ground-based and satellite observations indicate that tropical deforestation results in warmer, drier conditions at the local scale. Understanding the regional or global impacts of deforestation on climate, and ultimately on agriculture, requires modelling. General circulation models show that completely deforesting the tropics could result in global warming equivalent to that caused by burning of fossil fuels since 1850, with more warming and considerable drying in the tropics. More realistic scenarios of deforestation yield less warming and less drying, suggesting critical thresholds beyond which rainfall is substantially reduced. In regional, mesoscale models that capture topography and vegetation-based discontinuities, small clearings can actually enhance rainfall. At this smaller scale as well, a critical deforestation threshold exists, beyond which rainfall declines. Future agricultural productivity in the tropics is at risk from a deforestation-induced increase in mean temperature and the associated heat extremes and from a decline in mean rainfall or rainfall frequency. Through teleconnections, negative impacts on agriculture could extend well beyond the tropics.
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